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Abstract
In nonprofit organizations (NPOs) volunteers often work alongside paid workers. Such
a coproduction setting can lead to tension between the two worker groups. This paper
examines for the first time if and how volunteers influence the separation of paid employees,
and thus it contributes to the debate over whether volunteers can substitute paid workers.
Using Austrian data on an organizational level we find a significant impact of volunteers
on the separations of paid workers in NPOs facing increased competition. These findings
support the assumption that a partial substitution effect exists between paid workers and
volunteers.
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1 Introduction
In comparison to public and for-profit enterprises, nonprofit organizations (NPOs) can rely
more intensely on unpaid labor in the form of volunteer work. Given the growing importance of
service delivery by NPOs in many countries1 and the fact that these services are labor intensive,
it is astonishing how little is known about the relationship between paid and unpaid labor. In
some organizations, such as self-help groups, volunteers are vital for the very existence of the
organizations, whereas in other organizations they merely constitute an additional input factor,
whereas other NPOs do not have volunteers at all.
This phenomenon of collaboration between paid employees (“professionals”) and unpaid
employees has been labeled “coproduction” in the literature (see Brudney and England 1983).
While coproduction is commonly viewed as collaboration between paid service agents and cit-
izens to deliver services, it can be easily generalized into a nonprofit context (Handy et al.
2008). For NPOs coproduction then implies that they have to decide whether volunteers should
be involved in the production process, and if so, which tasks should be performed by paid
professionals and which by volunteer workers.
The coproduction setting in NPOs can lead to tension between paid and unpaid labor. While
Brudney and Gazley (2002) find no evidence for an adversarial relationship or a replacement
of paid personnel by volunteers, Handy et al. (2008) as well as Simmons and Emanuele (2010)
address this topic by describing unionized workplaces with provisions in collective agreements
that try to protect paid workers against their replacement by unpaid workers, or workplaces
preclude volunteer involvement entirely. So the question of a substitution effect on paid em-
ployees by volunteers remains thus far unresolved, especially as none of these studies is able to
address directly the influence of volunteers on the separations of paid employees.
In light of this, the following paper aims to examine this potentially tense relationship
between paid and unpaid workers, and investigates whether the presence of volunteers increases
separations for paid employees in NPOs to scrutinize the replacement fears expressed by the
above mentioned unions. More specifically, we examine for the first time the direct influence
of volunteer presence on separations of paid employees with nonprofit sector-wide data on an
organizational - and thus, demand - level. In our analyses we compare organizations that face
increased competition and those that operate under unchanged or even reduced competition.
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We make this distinction to account for various circumstances in the economic climates in which
the NPOs operate and which influence separations of paid staff.
Section 2 discusses existing literature concerning the relation between the two worker groups
before positing hypotheses in section 3. Section 4 describes the econometric specification as well
as the data used for the analyses. We describe the robustness checks to our results in section
5, present and discuss our findings in section 6 and provide a brief conclusion in section 7.
2 Background and existing literature
Volunteers’ roles are diverse and not necessarily distinct from paid workers’ roles (Handy et
al. 2008; Netting et al. 2005). Volunteers could either serve as complements or substitutes to
paid employees. In the first case, paid and unpaid workers assume different tasks within the
organization, whereas in the second case, paid employees and volunteers perform similar duties
so that volunteers can basically replace paid staff or vice versa.
In practice, volunteer workers are engaged in managerial or organizational core tasks, as
well as in auxiliary activities, which suggests that paid work and volunteer work can in fact
be interchangeable. However, not all NPOs make use of volunteer labor, while others choose a
mix of paid and unpaid labor to deliver their services, which points to incomplete substitution.
Otherwise, economic logic would suggest using unpaid work exclusively - provided that access
to volunteer work is unlimited. This is a typical assumption made in the study of volunteer
labor supply (see Menchik and Weisbrod 1987). Assuming that both types of labor are partial
substitutes, NPOs’ decisions regarding task assignments and the levels of paid and unpaid labor
inputs would in theory account for the marginal productivity of each type of labor. This means
that volunteer labor would be used until the change in output resulting from an additional unit
of volunteer labor equals the contribution of an additional unit of paid labor (see also Handy
et al. 2008).
Furthermore, labor legislation and/or union regulations have to be taken into account when
considering the types of jobs where substitution can be affected. It is interesting to note that
in May 2006, a collective bargaining agreement regulating labor issues was introduced to health
and social service industries. However, at the time of the survey there were no federal or re-
gional statutes concerning the use of volunteers. Moreover, no union regulation would have
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prevented a total replacement of paid staff by volunteers. Nonetheless, in principle, statutory
rules may set limits to the substitution process between paid and unpaid labor. For example,
giving injections requires professional training, can be conducted only by health professionals,
and therefore cannot be delegated to volunteers. As a further example, Stine (2008) mentions
that Pennsylvanian libraries are required to be headed by a professional librarian, when serving
populations of more than 20,000. However, these regulations may be undermined when the pro-
fessionals also volunteer. This phenomenon has received some attention in the literature. Rotolo
and Wilson (2006) show that, for the US, paid workers from the nonprofit sector (compared
to private, public, and self-employed workers) “are the most likely to volunteer and with the
most hours”. What is more, a paper by Baines (2004) documents that for social service workers
in three Canadian provinces (Alberta, British Columbia and Nova Scotia) in the course of an
adoption of new public management strategies, it became more and more common to expect
paid staff to work voluntarily at either the current employer or in the sector. Such a “canni-
balization effect” adds to the assumption that the substitution process between volunteers and
paid staff can be affected at all task levels in a NPO.
The literature on nonstandard labor is another strand which is of potential interest in the
given context. The “blended workforce literature” usually refers to several types of paid labor,
such as part-time work, contingent work, contract company employment, or independent con-
tracting (Davis-Blake et al. 2003; Pearce 1993). Even so, volunteer work usually escapes the
attention of researchers in this field, and so it can be considered as yet another form of nonstan-
dard labor, adding to the heterogeneity in a firm’s employment arrangements.2 The blended
workforce literature focuses on the impact of nonstandard labor on the job design for standard
workers and on the behavior of regular workers including psychological drivers of this behavior
(such as job satisfaction, commitment, extra-role behaviors, or specific dimensions of a paid
worker’s psychological contract with his employer). In the given context, contributions to this
strand of literature which concern employee separation are of particular interest. As expressed
by Davis-Blake et al. (2003; 475), “if the dynamics that affect loyalty and peer relationships
also lead to exit or voice, then blending may actually destabilize a work environment.”
Connelly and Gallagher (2004) point out that organizations can either integrate standard
and nonstandard work (in particular in terms of workers’ rights and entitlements or job design)
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or decide to separate the various types of work. The extent to which they follow a strategy
of “blending” rather than separating, e.g. unpaid and paid work when designing jobs, will
determine their substitutional or complementary relationship. The choice of strategy can be
expected to depend on an organization’s production technology, in particular on the importance
of tasks requiring firm-specific knowledge (Lautsch 2002). A strategy of integration is likely
to present a greater threat to paid workers and is therefore of specific interest in studying
separations.
The psychological contract model (McLean Parks et al. 1998; Rousseau 1995) is one of the
key pillars of the blended workforce literature. It posits that each type of work arrangement
comes with its “idiosyncratic set of expectations held by an employee regarding their reciprocal
obligations and entitlements” (McLean Parks et al. 1998; 698). The model suggests that the
(changes in the) psychological contract shape(s) work-related behavior - including decisions to
quit a job. According to this model, the presence of nonstandard labor could affect one or
several of the underlying dimensions of the psychological contract (e.g., stability or scope).
More specifically, proponents of this model hold that an increase in nonstandard labor loosens
the ties with a given employer. As a result “although the organization ... may classify certain
employees as core or permanent workers they may see themselves as temporary, and it is the
employees’ perceptions that will drive their expectations, attitudes and behaviors.” (McLean
Parks et al. 1998; 700)
Connelly and Gallagher (2004; 972) point to empirical research into negative consequences
for paid workers associated with an increased organizational reliance on nonstandard work.
Contingent work has been found to increase the workload of regular workers, trigger changes
in their portfolio of tasks, and weaken the opportunities for promotion for workers with a
lower work status. Similarly, in their empirical study, Broschak and Davis-Blake (2006) found
that an increase in the proportion of nonstandard work arrangements can worsen intragroup
relationships, reduce work-related helping behaviors at work and increase turnover intentions.
The latter effect is, however, confined to individuals in the lower job grade, which is in line
with the evidence presented by Connelly and Gallagher (2004). In summary, there is support
for an association between nonstandard work and separations, which seems to be of particular
relevance for workers at the lower end of an organization’s hierarchy.
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In explaining their findings, Broschak and Davis-Blake (2006) refer to Blalock’s (1967) theory
of majority-minority group relations, predicting rising levels of perceived economic and social
competition between the majority and minority group, the higher the share of the minority.
More specifically, regular workers might perceive a threat of status-loss (especially if nonstan-
dard workers perform the same tasks as they do) and a rivalry for attractive tasks. A recent
contribution by von Hippel and Kalokerinos (2012) is worth mentioning in this context because
it touches on the issue of voluntary nonstandard labor. The authors posit that regular workers’
responses to temporary co-workers will be more favorable if those temporary co-workers are
voluntary. They argue that voluntary temporary employees have no desire to obtain a regular
position, while regular temporary workers do. Therefore, voluntary temporary workers are not
considered competitors (nor are treated as such). Analogous to the empirical blended-workforce
literature – which so far has focused on paid forms of nonstandard work – several studies on
volunteer work have investigated paid employees’ attitudes toward volunteers and the optimal
mix between the two worker groups (e.g., Netting et al. 2004; Netting et al. 2005; Rogelberg et
al. 2010). In particular, Rogelberg et al. (2010) found poor relations between the two groups
of workers to be interrelated with augmented employee stress and discontent. Employees that
show a positive attitude toward volunteers show more organizational commitment and are less
likely to quit.
So far, a few studies have examined the relationship between paid and unpaid personnel.
Essentially, the existing literature seeks to answer two questions. First, there is the aforemen-
tioned discussion if volunteers (mainly) complement paid employees or if the substitution effect
prevails. Second, given that a substitutional relation between the two worker groups does exist,
can we observe an increased displacement of volunteer labor over time or the other way round?
The evidence from the studies examining these two questions is mixed.
To date, hardly any study has directly examined the changes in firm level demand for paid
workers when volunteer labor is used. Stine (2008) applies a translog cost function to estimate
cross-elasticities in order to determine whether paid and unpaid workers can be considered
substitutes or complements. He finds that volunteers in public libraries act as complements
rather than substitutes to paid staff. However, the approach via cost functions seems to be
particularly difficult in a nonprofit sector context. As Stine noted, it is already difficult to
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determine appropriate output variables to estimate translog cost functions for a homogeneous
group like libraries. Accordingly, it seems almost impossible to specify meaningful output
variables applying to each and every NPO, given the impossibility of determining a universal
“mission” (target function) for all NPOs together, a task that would however be necessary
to pursue the cost function approach. (James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) or Steinberg (2006)
provide a discussion of different NPO objective functions).
Thus, other approaches are prevalent when the focus is on the entire nonprofit sector. Sim-
mons and Emanuele (2010) investigate the association between the amount of donated volunteer
labor and state minimum wage regulations to answer the “substitutability-complementarity”
question. Using individual-level data from volunteers they find that a higher minimum wage in
a state is associated with a higher supply of volunteer labor and infer that volunteers supplant
workers who work on minimum wages. However, the data only reflects volunteer supply and not
specifically the organizational demand. Is more volunteer time offered by individuals because
the NPOs have a higher demand for it? An alternative interpretation, in our view, is that
people who earn more because of higher wages might be able to allocate a larger part of their
non-leisure time to volunteer work.
Regarding the second question, whether paid employees crowd out volunteers over time or
vice versa, both possibilities have been argued. Some authors observe a tendency towards spe-
cialization, professionalization and formalization in organizations which makes the employment
of volunteers harder (see Seippel 2002), while others assume that volunteer work will be even
more significant in the future because of an expected decline of continuity and importance of
traditional paid full-time employment (e.g., Beck 2001) and declining budgets. (For a discus-
sion, see Hustinx, 2007). Handy et al. (2008) report results from two national online surveys
of Canadian nonprofits and a case study of two Canadian hospitals. Based on a case study and
simple correlation analysis using the data from their online surveys, they find different patterns
of volunteer and paid worker employment. On the one hand, NPOs report a tendency towards
professionalization and thus towards a replacement of volunteers through paid employees, i.e.
a rise in paid staff leads to a decline in the need for volunteers. On the other hand, volunteers
also replace paid workers, especially in times of financial stress. This latter result provides the
first hints that the organizational development of NPOs is an important factor in how volunteer
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work is used. Unfortunately, Handy et al. (2008) do not ground their evidence in a multivariate,
econometric framework.
Handy et al. (2008) assert that the replacement process between paid and unpaid work is
complex, oscillates, and is not necessarily stable over time. This, however, is exactly what can
be read from Emanuele (1996), who finds that organizations remain stable over time in the way
they use volunteer input.
In a study of Norwegian sports organizations, Seippel (2002) finds that paid employment
rises with both augmenting organization size and increasing sales returns. The importance
of volunteer work decreases in relation to paid work but not necessarily the time donated by
volunteers.
Additionally, there are two other strands of literature that are worth mentioning for the
purpose of this paper, although they do not discuss the aforementioned questions directly. The
first is concerned with NPO’s demand for voluntary labor in general (Emanuele 1996; Ferris
1988; Handy and Srinivasan 2005). One important finding is that voluntary labor comes at some
cost for NPOs, e.g., for supervising volunteers, providing equipment or office space. Using data
from four US cities (Chicago, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Phoenix) in 1982 and 1984, Emanuele
(1996) presents evidence that NPOs have a consistent and downward sloping demand curve for
volunteer labor over time. Her results show that organizations do not necessarily accept all
volunteer labor offered and that their demand for volunteer labor is stable over time.
Summing up, only a few studies so far have investigated the production-related relationship
and interchangeability over time between paid employees and volunteers. Evidence from exist-
ing research is mixed. We learn from the studies that substitutional as well as complementary
volunteer employment can be found in organizations, depending on the nature of the organiza-
tion and the specific tasks to be performed. However, from existing research, it is reasonable to
believe that especially low-paid workers have reason to feel threatened by volunteer presence,
because unpaid workers can substitute them more easily.
Against this backdrop, our own empirical analysis investigates for the first time directly
whether the use of volunteers influences separations of paid labor in NPOs. By doing so,
we observe changes in employment in NPOs and possible substitution effects. In order to
be accurate about the organizational demand for workers, we use data on an organizational
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level. Moreover, our study is concerned with the nonprofit sector as a whole, in order to supply
information on a more general level. In section 3, we will now lay out our hypotheses concerning
the influence of volunteers on paid employees’ separations.
3 Hypotheses
We want to analyze in greater detail the question whether volunteers act as substitutes to paid
employees, and thus examine the influence of volunteer presence on the separations of paid
employees in Austrian NPOs. Firm level separations consist of the sum of quits (“voluntary
separations”) and layoffs (“involuntary separations”), which are in our data unfortunately not
separable. Therefore, we offer some explanations on possible driving forces behind both quits
and layoffs.
In our analyses we use competition as an indicator to distinguish the economic conditions
under which a certain NPO operates. We differentiate between NPOs facing increased com-
petition and those NPOs facing a stable or favorable economic environment, i.e. observing
unchanged or even decreased competition in that period of time. The questionnaire asks if
the number of organizations that are perceived as direct competitors has increased, remained
stable or decreased in the five years prior to the survey (i.e., in the time period from 2000 to
2005). Alternatively, the organization could also state that there are no direct competitors.
Thus, we measure self-declared, subjectively-perceived competition, and by this we follow the
approach of several existing studies (e.g., Hay and Kamshad 1994; Robson and Obeng 2008).
We hypothesize that volunteers might have a different effect on the employment of paid staff
when the competitive environment changes for an organization. We argue that the question
whether volunteers act as substitutes or complements might be more pressing in NPOs with
increased competition, which means that paid and unpaid labor can be seen as “conditional”
substitutes. This “conditional substitution hypothesis” is formulated below in two parts.
The Austrian nonprofit sector can be described as “service-dominant”, which means that
most nonprofit employees are active in health and social services. NPOs in Austria are often
heavily dependent financially on public funding (e.g., Neumayr et al. 2007; Salamon et al. 2003)
which presents a serious challenge in times of fiscal austerity. Furthermore, health and social
service providers face increasing competition and tight budgets. Governments have sought to
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limit spending on social services by way of introducing new public management and opening
service markets to competition (e.g., Bonoli et al. 2000; Kautto 1997; Starke 2008). Increased
competition between NPOs or with new market players such as for-profit firms will have the
effect of lowering possible profits for the NPOs. While NPOs can and do make profits, they
operate, however, per definition under a non-distribution constraint (e.g., Anheier and Salamon
2006), which prohibits the distribution of profits to the owners of the firm, but guarantees that
such profits are distributed among the stakeholders, e.g. clients, paid staff or volunteers. It
is therefore quite plausible to assume that NPOs operating under stable or decreased compe-
tition have a higher probability of reinvesting its profits to help sustain the NPO or improve
their employees’ working conditions, while NPOs under increased competition will lack such
possibilities.
Consequently, under increased competition and lowered profits NPOs have to seek alterna-
tive ways to finance their activities and to maintain service at a certain level. As many NPOs
operate under government contracts with fixed prices and/or because NPOs aim to offer an
affordable service to often underprivileged customers, cutting costs is a more feasible strategy
to respond to increased competition instead of increasing prices.
As a result, given the fact that labor costs are most often the greatest expense in a NPO’s
budget, they could resort to using volunteer work more heavily in order to cut labor costs when
facing shrinking profits due to increased competition. Hence, an initial reaction of NPOs could
be a direct replacement of paid staff by unpaid workers in order to maintain service levels and/or
quality while avoiding service disruption.
As an aftereffect, highly productive workers might react by leaving the struggling NPO and
seek employment elsewhere. This reaction is supported by the literature as Schwerdt (2011)
shows for Austria that the early leavers (before a plant closure) are associated with significantly
better post-separation labor market outcomes and suffer significantly less from separating from
a closing plant compared to the workers that are ultimately displaced. In the Austrian context,
such an effect is enforced by the legal obligation for firms with more than 20 employees to give
an advance notice when laying off more than 5 employees. (This is regulated in §45a AMFG
and affects 85.3% of the employees in our sample) While this staff loss may occur with and
without volunteers in NPOs, this effect might be aggravated when NPOs use volunteers, as
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paid employees might anticipate that layoffs are more likely in NPOs with volunteers.
If this second effect takes place, the workforce mix of an NPO is altered and becomes rela-
tively dominated by less productive workers (without outside options) and volunteers. However,
as discussed in the literature (Simmons and Emanuele 2010) we know that low wage workers in
particular are prone to a replacement by volunteers. This again could aggravate an increase in
the separations rate through intensified layoffs by NPOs using volunteers.
Another possible mechanism shows on the other hand that intrinsically motivated workers
might also leave NPOs due to increased competition. Such a mechanism can be triggered if
paid employees are, in the wake of increased competition, forced to concentrate on their core
professional activities, while “soft” work is done by volunteers. For example, in health and social
services, this could mean that professionals are reduced to medical work, e.g. giving injections,
fulfilling documentation obligations, etc., while volunteers engage in relationship building with
patients. While (more) extrinsically motivated workers will not be affected by such a shift, this
might well be the case for intrinsically motivated workers. In contrast, such a shift will not
take place in NPOs without volunteers, where the redeployment of work might happen between
extrinsically and intrinsically motivated workers.3 This mechanism can also be related to the
literature of work intensification (see, e.g. Green 2004). Green mentions as one important
explanation for the intensification of work an increased competitive environment and traces the
effects of intensification amongst other things back to the increased use of nonstandard workers.
A final consideration for why NPOs using volunteer work might experience an increased sep-
aration rate when competition increases is due the possible transitioning of aging workers from
paid work to volunteer work. Such a consideration can be found, e.g. in human resource liter-
ature (see Schlosser and Zinni 2011). These authors are investigating this topic as a possibility
to “stem the loss of organizational learning by developing strong social exchanges that encour-
age employees to pursue post-retirement volunteering.” Converting paid workers into volunteer
workers seems to be especially desirable in times of increased competition. This strategy re-
duces labor costs without reducing service delivery. It implies an increase in separations of paid
workers while preserving organization specific knowledge. Therefore, it may foster substitution
between paid and unpaid workers especially in times of increased competition.
Therefore, our first hypothesis (H1) can be stated as follows:
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“In NPOs facing increased competition the presence of volunteers leads to higher separations
among paid staff in NPOs using volunteer labor than in those not using volunteer labor. This
could be seen as an indicator for a substitution effect between paid employees and volunteers.”
Assuming that a stable or decreased competition, i.e. a stabilization or reduction of competi-
tors, will lead to higher profits for the NPO this in turn allows the distribution of these profits
under the stakeholders. As a consequence, possible positive effects for the relationship between
paid and unpaid workers could emerge, irrespective of whether the volunteers assume comple-
mentary or substitutive tasks. Preston (1988; 339) mentions the argument that, in imperfectly
competitive markets, volunteer labor can decrease the (labor) costs for a NPO, “allowing non-
profit managers the discretion to funnel more revenue into salaries without increasing the price
of service.” In such circumstances the presence of unpaid co-workers could be seen as positive.
Additionally, Leete (2006; 166) mentions that nonprofit employees working together with vol-
unteers are perhaps more gratified than their for-profit counterparts. As working conditions
are an important predictor of labor turnover (see Bo¨ckerman and Ilmakunnas 2009 for recent
evidence) this can have a positive influence on retention.
Thus, we argue that in NPOs facing no competition or even decreased competition volunteers
are perceived more positively by paid employees. Therefore, our second hypothesis (H2)
can be stated as follows:
“In NPOs facing no competition the presence of volunteers leads to lower separations even
if volunteers act as substitutes for paid employees.”
4 Data and econometric specification
Research in the nonprofit sector is often hindered by insufficient data concerning paid and
unpaid labor due to a lack of compulsory and/or systematic statistical reporting, in contrast to
other established sectors of the economy.
Our work is based on a unique data set for Austria. Data were gathered in 2006 by means
of a mail survey that was sent to all Austrian NPOs with at least one paid employee. We have
information for a myriad of industries that are relevant to the non-profit world, and the ques-
tionnaire placed particular emphasis on employment, income, expenditure and organizational
activities. In total, 4,590 organizations were contacted, and 798 questionnaires were returned,
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yielding a response rate of 17.39%. (See Haider et al. (2008) for a more detailed description
of the data). In the following we use a subset of 540 organizations for which we have full in-
formation concerning the variables used in the econometric analysis, i.e. we do our regression
analysis by listwise deletion. The relatively low response rate raises the issue of a possible
nonresponse bias. While a low response rate does not automatically lead to a nonresponse bias
(see Groves 2006), it is important to note that in our case the full sample (798 organizations)
covers about 38% of paid gross wages in the nonprofit sector. This information is received
from Statistik Austria, the national statistical authority, matching the organizational data with
the wage withholding tax statistics (see Haider et al. 2008 for a more detailed description of
the data). Therefore, we can assume that large organizations (or better paying NPOs) are
somewhat oversampled, i.e. small (or lower paying) organizations had a higher nonresponse
rate. Drawing from the literature on missing data and sample selection, we know that this is
not a problem if we include in our regression analysis all variables that possibly influence the
probability of a missing value. However, while we have included the control variables to the
best of our judgment to control for the generation of missing values, the fact remains that if
our analysis fails to control for all variables influencing missingness, i.e. if the missing values
depend on unobserved predictors, the presented estimates will be biased.
As dependent variables we use firm level separations. To adjust for scale effects we build
the separations rate (SR), by dividing the absolute number of separations of paid employees
through the sum of all paid employees at the end of the year 2005.
The independent variables used are summarized by the vector X. Our main focus lies on the
influence of volunteers on separations of paid staff. This is measured with a dummy variable
taking the value one if the NPO uses volunteers and zero otherwise. In order to control for the
task area of volunteers, four dummy variables are included indicating whether the volunteers
are engaged in managerial tasks, the core tasks of the NPO, administrative tasks, or other tasks.
In addition, further control variables are added to the vector X to explain the separations of
paid employees. We include the logarithm of total employment of the NPOs to control for size
effects in the SR. To cover the employment structure and different employment policies that
are important for separations at the company level, we include the ratio of atypical employees,
measured as workers with a contract for services plus independent contractors (“freie Dienst-
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nehmer”) on total employment, as well as the share of employees with an employment duration
greater than five years. We define two specific Austrian contract types as atypical employees,
so-called “new self-employed” workers and “independent” contractors. Both forms can be in-
terpreted as forms of self-employed persons who are economically dependent on one “employer”
(see Eurofound 2010 for an overview of atypical forms of work in Austria). We assume that,
on an organizational level, a higher share of atypical employees reduces hirings and the separa-
tions of paid staff. We explain this by the fact that the presence of atypical employees allows
the NPOs to adjust to demand fluctuations without the need for hiring or separating existing
staff, as the workload of atypical employees can be shifted relatively easily.4 Especially for those
NPOs operating in an uncertain funding environment, this can be an important strategy. In
the same way, but for different reasons, we expect the share of long term employees (employees
with employment duration of 5 or more years on total employees) to reduce separations. Plenty
of evidence shows that long term employees exhibit a reduced probability of terminating an
employment contract. Accordingly, this variable can be considered as a proxy for the existence
of employer- or match-specific capital. (see e.g., Farber 1999)
To control for the dependency on public funding, we add a dummy variable that captures
the reliance on public funding. Table 6 in the appendix reveals that 28.3% of all NPOs do not
receive public funding. Moreover, Table 1 shows that the percentage of “no public funding” in
NPOs facing increased competition is 31.1%, approximately five percentage points higher than
the value in NPOs facing no competition (26.3%). A dummy for the existence of work councils is
included to control for the exit-voice hypothesis as proposed by Freeman (1980). Work councils
offer a possibility to reveal and settle potential problems in the collaboration of paid employees
and volunteers. Therefore, we expect the existence of work councils to reduce the separations
of paid employees.
To capture the economic development of the NPOs under observation, we additionally con-
trol whether the development of revenues and expenditures in the five years prior to the survey
have decreased, increased or remained unchanged. Additionally, we include dummy variables
to control for industry affiliation on a 2-digit level.
The sample is divided along the variable “competition”. We create two subsamples, one
consisting of NPOs perceiving increased competition and one of NPOs perceiving a stable sit-
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uation or decreased competition. As argued in section 3, we hypothesize that volunteers might
have a different effect on the employment of paid staff in different economic circumstances. A
detailed overview of the summary statistics for the relevant variables is given in Table 1.
–Table 1 here–
The dependent variable, SR, has a natural lower bound at zero and contains a nontrivial number
of zeros (307 observations, i.e. 56.85% of all cases), thus a Tobit regression for corner solution
is our starting point.5 We estimate the Tobit regressions, separately for NPOs facing increased
competition and NPOs facing no increased competition:
(1) SRi
* = βX i + ui with ui | X i ∼ Normal(0, σ)
and
(2) SRi = max(0, SRi
*)
The Tobit regression in (1) is estimated for a latent variable (SR*), which is difficult to interpret
in corner solution applications. The latent variable involves the conception of an underlying
“propensity to separate” that can take on negative values. Such a “propensity” is an odd
construct for the analysis of observable separation rates. Therefore, of greater interest is the
unconditional expected value of the SR, E[SRi | X i], which consists of the probability of being
above the limit and the expected value conditional on being above the limit:
(3) E(SRi | X i) = P (SRi > 0 | X i) · E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0)
As McDonald and Moffit(1980) have shown, a decomposition obtained by a partial derivation
of the unconditional expected value, E[SRi | X i], given in (3) yields the
i) marginal effects on the probability of being above zero,
∂P (SRi > 0 | X i)/∂X i
ii) marginal effects conditional on being above zero,
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∂E[SRi | X i, SRi > 0]/∂X i
which both have an interesting economic interpretation.
∂E(SRi | X i)
∂X i
=
∂P (SRi > 0 | X i)
∂X i
· E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0) +
+ P (SRi > 0 | X i) · ∂E(SRi | X i, SRi > 0)
∂X i
(4)
For our purposes, this means that we concentrate firstly on the effect of the change in the
probability of separating paid staff when a NPO would change their volunteer policy from not
using volunteers to using volunteers, as given by the first product on the right hand side of (4).
And secondly, we will respond to the effect of volunteer presence on separations for those NPOs
that actually lay off paid staff, as given by the second product on the right hand side of (4).
5 Robustness checks
As Tobit regressions are often criticized for not being very robust to a violation of the underlying
assumptions, (e.g., Angrist and Pischke 2009) we conduct several checks concerning the robust-
ness of our results. First of all, Tobit regressions heavily require normality and homoscedasticity
of the error term. Thus, we conduct a conditional moment (CM) test to control for the nor-
mality of the error term using the tobcm command implemented in STATA (Drukker 2002).
Additionally, we also apply an LM-test to test the Tobit specification against the alternative
of a model with non-linear regressors and a heteroskedastic or non-normally distributed error
term. As the results for both tests (see table 2 and table 3) show problems with the assump-
tions of normality and homoskedasticity of the error term, we furthermore compare the Tobit
estimates divided by the standard error of the regression, σ, with the probit estimates of the
same regression to obtain “a rough idea of the appropriateness of the Tobit model” (Wooldridge
2010; 687).
To further check the robustness of our results and to circumvent the problems with the
strong assumptions that the Tobit model places on the error term, u, we additionally estimate
a linear probability model (LPM). The LPM has the advantage that although its error term is
heteroskedastic by definition, it can account for the heteroskedasticity by using robust standard
errors as obtained by White (1980) so that the LPM model will definitely report unbiased point
16
estimates. Furthermore, the parameters of the LPM can directly be interpreted as marginal
effects.
Finally, to conduct a further check whether our results are robust irrespective of the choice
of the functional form and the estimation method used, we will also apply a method partic-
ularly suitable for rates or fractions as dependent variables, as this is the case with the SR.
One possibility of dealing with rates in the dependent variable is a beta regression framework
which builds on the beta distribution. The beta distribution can handle various distributional
shapes, assuming that the dependent variable can be regarded as continuous and bounded in
an interval with two known endpoints. Therefore, beta regressions are very flexible concerning
the problem of nonnormality in the error term or heteroskedasticity, a problem both in Tobit
and LPM models. More details on the robustness checks are given in the appendix.
– Table 2 here –
– Table 3 here –
– Table 4 here –
6 Empirical results and discussion
From the regression results in table 2, it becomes apparent that the first hypothesis, H1, regard-
ing NPOs facing increased competition, can be corroborated. Indeed, the presence of volunteers
is significantly related to the separations of paid staff. Column (3) of table 2 reveals that the
probability of separations for NPOs under increased competition is 24.4% higher if the NPOs
can use volunteers in their operations. The LPM gives a similar result for NPOs under increased
competition as it states that the probability of separations is 21.0% higher if NPOs have access
to volunteers (column (1), table 4). Moreover, NPOs with volunteers are also more likely to
have separations at or above the mean of the SR (column (2), table 4). Concerning those NPOs
that actually lay off paid employees the Tobit regressions shows that the SR is 5.7% points
higher if the NPOs make use of volunteers (column (4), table 2). This is comparable to the
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result of the beta regression for NPOs with increasing competition. Column 3 in table 4 states
that for a NPO with a SR of 12% (i.e. at the sample mean) the involvement of volunteers is
positively correlated with a 5% points higher SR, which is an increase in the SR of more than
40% for NPOs with volunteers compared to NPOs without volunteers. The Tobit regression
results for NPOs with increasing competition show that the higher SR related to volunteer
involvement is attenuated by the opposite effect of a reduced SR when volunteers are engaged
in main tasks. However, as the robustness checks reject the statistical significance of this effect
we dismiss the significant influence of this attenuating effect. The logarithmic size is the only
other variable that is positively correlated with the SR on a relevant statistical level. Further
statistical significant control variables negatively associated with the SR are, as expected, the
share of atypical employees, the share of employees with a length of employment of more than
five years, and the work council.
The second hypothesis, H2, relating to the separations of paid staff in NPOs facing decreasing
or stable competition, cannot be corroborated. Although the coefficient goes in the expected
direction the volunteer presence is not statistically significant related to the SR of paid staff in
those NPOs (see results table 3). The only exception are NPOs with volunteers engaged in other
tasks. In that case, the SR is significantly higher, contrary to our hypothesis, even when a NPO
faces a stable or decreasing competition. The LPM again delivers similar results as the Tobit
regressions since it also shows no significant effect of the volunteer dummy on the SR. Concerning
the further control variables, it becomes apparent that the atypical employees (only in the LPM
at µ) as well as the employees with length of service of more than five years again are significantly
associated with lower separations in these NPO, for reasons described in section 4. Unlike in
the case for NPOs with increased competition, the expenditure variable becomes significant for
NPOs facing decreasing or stable competition. Compared to decreased expenditures, increased
and unchanged expenditures are negatively correlated with the SR for NPOs facing decreasing
or stable competition. As previously explained, the Austrian NPO sector is “service-dominant”,
which implicates that the services offered are mostly labor intensive. In addition, with the non-
distribution constraint of profits for NPOs, we can assume that the NPOs facing stable or
declined competition are capitalizing on a friendly economic environment to reinvest money in
working conditions, leading to a reduced SR.
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In summary, our findings point to the existence of a conditional substitution effect. NPOs
facing increased competition have a higher SR when volunteers are involved in the NPO opera-
tions. Our empirical results substantially support the hypothesis that volunteers in these NPOs
may be used in order to replace paid workers. In NPOs with stable or decreased competition we
find no statistically significant effect for the volunteer dummy on separations of paid employees
with the exception of an increasing effect in the case of volunteers engaged in other tasks.
7 Conclusion
Volunteer work is a major labor source for NPOs. Nevertheless, comparatively little research
exists concerning relations between volunteers and paid staff. In this paper, we analyzed the
association of volunteer involvement on separations of paid employees in NPOs. Previous studies
have either analyzed only specific sectors and/or public organizations or used individual-level
data to investigate the relation between paid work and volunteer work. By contrast, in this
paper we studied the volunteer presence with sector-wide data on an organizational – and
thus demand – level. We also distinguished between organizations in a different competitive
environment. By doing so we emphasized the importance of the economic environment when
looking at the relationship between volunteers and paid employees.
The results show that volunteer presence is positively related with higher separations in
NPOs facing increased competition, but has no significant relation to separations in NPOs
with stable or decreased competition. We interpret our findings as indicative for a conditional
substitution effect between volunteers and paid workers that has been discussed previously in
the literature. This effect can lead to possible tensions between the two worker groups.
Against the backdrop of public austerity policies, the funding environment of NPOs is ex-
pected to become ever more challenging. At the same time, the political rhetoric encourages
civic engagement and volunteer work. Thus, indications are that NPOs will continue, and maybe
revive, their use of volunteer labor in order to sustain the level and quality of services they pro-
vide to society, especially in social care and health care. Policy makers and organizations alike
should be aware of possible tensions between volunteers and paid staff when employing both
worker groups. Research on the relation between both types of workers is highly relevant and
should therefore continue.
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However, due to the relatively small sample size, our results for the substitution of paid staff
and volunteers must be interpreted with caution and should be understood as a starting point for
further research on that topic. More data collection concerning this topic has to be conducted.
The availability of panel data would be especially advantageous in dealing with unobserved
heterogeneity, an issue that is problematic in our cross-sectional study, and that prevents us
from drawing causal inferences. Additionally, with panel data the use of more refined measures
of volunteer involvement, such as hours of volunteering would be possible. With cross-sectional
data an hourly measure would cause a simultaneity problem between separations of paid staff
and volunteering hours. Furthermore, it would be interesting if the findings of this study could
be replicated for other countries and other types of welfare states. Further analysis should also
try to make a distinction between voluntary and involuntary separations, an issue we could
not resolve with our data. Nevertheless, this could give further insight into the effects that are
driving the separations of paid employees, a topic which we can only theoretically consider in
our study. Moreover, as nonprofit leaders have “to manage a double bottom line of financial
results and social impact” (Worth, 2012), organizational leadership also seems to be important
for the decision to employ volunteers (or not), the allocation of tasks to volunteers as well as a
possible replacement process between paid staff and volunteers. In contrast, our article views
the transmission of organizational decisions concerning the (non) employment of volunteers and
the optimal mix of paid staff and volunteers as a black box, while it is likely that the attitudes
toward these problems are shaped by different kinds of organizational leadership. However, as
information concerning organizational leadership is not available to us, this question remains
also open for further research.
8 Endnotes
1.) For a sample of 35 countries Salamon et al. (2003) find that the total workforce for the
nonprofit sector for the years 1995-1998 is 39.5 million fulltime equivalent workers. As a conse-
quence, the nonprofit sector employs on average 4.4% of the economically active population. In
comparative figures for the investigated countries (inter alia, the USA, Japan, and Germany)
this means tenfold higher employment than the utilities and textile industries and fivefold more
workers than the food manufacturing industry and 20% more workers than the transportation
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industry (Salamon et al. 2003; 13f.)
2.) We thank one of our anonymous referees for pointing us to this strand of literature and its
relevance for the study of volunteer work.
3.) We thank two referees for their consideration that also the opposite effect might be possible.
That is, paid workers might value the presence of volunteers also under increased competition
because of their ability to share an even heavier per-worker workload. Unfortunately neither
of both assumptions is direct testable with our rough separations measure, however the econo-
metric evidence somewhat favors our assumption. However it could also be the case that the
positive effect, mentioned by the referees, is indeed taking place but is overlaid by the other
(negative) effects.
4.) See, for example Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) for a dynamic model concerning the
influence of flexible labor contracts on employment. Boockmann and Hagen (2005) provide
empirical evidence for Germany on that phenomenon.
5.) Wooldridge (2010, Ch. 17) clarifies the distinction between corner solution responses and
the problem of censored data, which both make use of the Tobit model structure.
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Table 2: Tobit regression for NPOs with increasing competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR* ∂E[SR|X]/∂X ∂Pr[SR > 0|X]/∂X E[SR|X,SR > 0]/∂X
Volunteer dummy 0.168** 0.076** 0.244** 0.057**
(0.067) (0.031) (0.099) (0.023)
Managerial tasks -0.020 -0.009 -0.030 -0.007
(0.065) (0.030) (0.095) (0.022)
Main tasks -0.126** -0.052* -0.181** -0.040**
(0.059) (0.027) (0.087) (0.020)
Administrative tasks -0.098 -0.042 -0.143 -0.032
(0.061) (0.028) (0.090) (0.021)
Other tasks -0.032 -0.014 -0.047 -0.011
(0.063) (0.029) (0.093) (0.022)
Employer size 0.093*** 0.043*** 0.137*** 0.032***
(0.021) (0.010) (0.031) (0.007)
Atypical employees -0.073*** -0.034*** -0.108*** -0.025***
(0.022) (0.010) (0.032) (0.007)
Long term employees -0.334*** -0.154*** -0.493*** -0.114***
(0.085) (0.039) (0.125) (0.029)
Work council -0.123* -0.050* -0.175* -0.039*
(0.064) (0.029) (0.094) (0.022)
Public funding 0.047 0.022 0.069 0.016
(0.047) (0.021) (0.069) (0.016)
Increased revenues 0.014 0.006 0.020 0.005
(0.083) (0.038) (0.122) (0.028)
Unchanged revenues -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.002
(0.088) (0.041) (0.130) (0.030)
Increased expenditures 0.136 0.054 0.193 0.042
(0.129) (0.060) (0.191) (0.044)
Unchanged expenditures 0.127 0.068 0.186 0.049
(0.140) (0.064) (0.206) (0.048)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.196
(0.135)
Observations 228 228 228 228
Pseudo R2 0.396
BIC 243.279
CM Test 33.167**
LM Test 24.812***
Log likelihood -70.061
Marginal effects in columns (2), (3) and (4).
Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean for continuous variables and for discrete change of 0 to 1 for dummy
variables.
Following Veall and Zimmermann (1994) we use the pseudo R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) for Tobit
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Tobit regressions for NPOs with decreasing/stable competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SR* ∂E[SR|X]/∂X ∂Pr[SR > 0|X]/∂X E[SR|X,SR > 0]/∂X
Volunteer dummy -0.066 -0.023 -0.065 -0.019
(0.096) (0.032) (0.094) (0.027)
Managerial tasks 0.111 0.037 0.108 0.031
(0.083) (0.028) (0.081) (0.023)
Main tasks 0.047 0.016 0.047 0.013
(0.074) (0.025) (0.072) (0.021)
Administrative tasks -0.020 -0.007 -0.019 -0.006
(0.070) (0.023) (0.068) (0.020)
Other tasks 0.168** 0.065*** 0.171** 0.051**
(0.072) (0.024) (0.070) (0.020)
Employer size 0.100*** 0.033*** 0.098*** 0.028***
(0.026) (0.009) (0.025) (0.007)
Atypical employees -0.015 -0.005 -0.014 -0.004
(0.017) (0.006) (0.017) (0.005)
Long term employees -0.378*** -0.126*** -0.369*** -0.106***
(0.092) (0.031) (0.090) (0.026)
Work council 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.005
(0.088) (0.029) (0.086) (0.025)
Public funding -0.071 -0.023 -0.068 -0.019
(0.062) (0.021) (0.060) (0.017)
Increased revenues 0.119 0.039 0.115 0.033
(0.108) (0.036) (0.106) (0.030)
Unchanged revenues 0.007 0.002 0.006 0.002
(0.119) (0.040) (0.116) (0.033)
Increased expenditures -0.470*** -0.221*** -0.471*** -0.166***
(0.150) (0.050) (0.146) (0.042)
Unchanged expenditures -0.390** -0.090 -0.305* -0.091*
(0.168) (0.056) (0.164) (0.047)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.215
(0.137)
Observations 312 312 312 312
Pseudo R2 0.252
BIC 388.503
CM Test 22.832**
LM Test 39.152***
Log likelihood -139.693
Marginal effects in columns (2), (3) and (4).
Marginal effects are evaluated at the mean for continuous variables and for discrete change of 0 to 1 for dummy
variables.
Following Veall and Zimmermann (1994) we use the pseudo R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975) for Tobit
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Regression results for the robustness checks
NPOs increasing competition NPOs decreasing/stable competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LPM at 0 LPM at µ Beta Reg. LPM at 0 LPM at µ Beta Reg.
Volunteer dummy 0.210** 0.221** 0.050* -0.023 -0.053 -0.018
(0.083) (0.099) (0.025) (0.085) (0.087) (0.032)
Managerial tasks -0.040 -0.045 -0.017 0.123 0.064 0.024
(0.084) (0.091) (0.023) (0.075) (0.075) (0.027)
Main tasks -0.062 -0.055 -0.016 -0.002 0.029 0.005
(0.077) (0.083) (0.021) (0.067) (0.069) (0.024)
Administrative tasks -0.078 -0.042 -0.024 -0.027 0.021 0.001
(0.081) (0.086) (0.021) (0.063) (0.066) (0.023)
Other tasks -0.008 -0.046 -0.005 0.124* 0.122* 0.043
(0.073) (0.081) (0.022) (0.068) (0.067) (0.027)
Employer size 0.194*** 0.124*** 0.033*** 0.199*** 0.072*** 0.023***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.008) (0.022) (0.025) (0.009)
Atypical employees -0.067*** -0.058*** -0.014*** -0.015 -0.029*** -0.004
(0.011) (0.012) (0.004) (0.020) (0.009) (0.006)
Long term employees -0.333*** -0.319*** -0.085*** -0.228*** -0.201*** -0.050*
(0.094) (0.096) (0.029) (0.067) (0.065) (0.026)
Work council -0.068 -0.155 -0.031 0.047 0.093 0.016
(0.078) (0.096) (0.021) (0.083) (0.091) (0.032)
Public funding 0.001 0.060 0.009 -0.017 0.002 -0.010
(0.059) (0.066) (0.017) (0.053) (0.054) (0.018)
Increased revenues 0.032 0.002 0.003 0.026 0.026 0.017
(0.102) (0.099) (0.028) (0.081) (0.077) (0.029)
Unchanged revenues 0.031 -0.041 -0.005 -0.033 0.010 -0.006
(0.120) (0.117) (0.031) (0.089) (0.084) (0.032)
Increased expenditures 0.155 0.101 0.012 -0.275* -0.375** -0.109*
(0.119) (0.120) (0.037) (0.157) (0.150) (0.065)
Unchanged expenditures 0.158 0.152 0.012 -0.259 -0.342** -0.071*
(0.160) (0.159) (0.048) (0.172) (0.164) (0.041)
Sector affiliation YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 0.034 0.106 -2.396*** 0.338** 0.554*** -1.278
(0.122) (0.126) (0.380) (0.158) (0.154) (0.379)
Observations 228 228 228 312 312 312
BIC -687.402 -1236.541
Log likelihood 395.280 672.829
R-squared 0.378 0.206 0.305 0.118
Marginal effects for beta regressions; Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Tobit/σ – probit coefficient comparison
Increased competition Decreased competition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit/σ Probit Tobit/σ Probit
Volunteer dummy 0.625∗∗ 0.881∗∗ -0.177 -0.223
Managerial tasks -0.078 -0.334 0.298 0.520∗
Main tasks -0.468∗∗ -0.082 0.126 0.100
Administrative tasks -0.364 -0.288 -0.054 -0.113
Other tasks -0.119 -0.083 0.450∗∗ 0.590∗∗
Employer size 0.346∗∗∗ 0.883∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗
Atypical employees -0.271∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ -0.040 -0.081
Long term employees -1.242∗∗∗ -1.447∗∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -1.110∗∗∗
Work council -0.457∗ -0.331 0.051 0.186
Public funding 0.175 0.107 -0.190 -0.140
Increased revenues 0.052 0.026 0.319 0.164
Unchanged revenues -0.026 0.048 0.019 -0.065
Increased expenditures 0.506 0.748 -1.260∗∗∗ -1.140∗∗
Unchanged expenditures 0.472 0.785 -1.046∗∗ -1.117∗∗
Industry affiliation YES YES YES YES
Constant -0.196 -1.932∗∗∗ 0.215 -0.912
Observations 228 228 312 312
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Summary statistics all NPOs
Mean sd Min Max
Separations Rate 0.108 0.195 0.000 1.000
Volunteer dummy 0.591 0.492 0.000 1.000
Mangerial tasks 0.435 0.496 0.000 1.000
Main tasks 0.259 0.439 0.000 1.000
Administrative tasks 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000
Other tasks 0.194 0.396 0.000 1.000
Employer size 2.036 1.329 0.000 8.097
Atypical employees 0.449 1.907 0.000 21.250
Long term employees 0.426 0.319 0.000 1.000
Work council 0.137 0.344 0.000 1.000
Public funding 0.283 0.451 0.000 1.000
Increased revenues 0.611 0.488 0.000 1.000
Unchanged revenues 0.254 0.436 0.000 1.000
Reduced revenues 0.135 0.342 0.000 1.000
Increased expenditures 0.800 0.400 0.000 1.000
Unchanged expenditures 0.148 0.356 0.000 1.000
Reduced expenditures 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
Education 0.402 0.491 0.000 1.000
Health and social work 0.241 0.428 0.000 1.000
Activities of membership organizations 0.276 0.447 0.000 1.000
Recreational, cultural and sporting activities 0.059 0.236 0.000 1.000
Observations 540
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Robustness checks
To compare the Tobit estimates divided by the standard error of the regression, σ, with the
probit estimates of the same regression, we design a binary dependent variable with the following
property:
(5) SRi =

1 if SRi > 0
0 if SRi = 0
This comparison reveals that the coefficients of both models are relatively similar and that
there are no significant sign changes between the Tobit/σ model and the probit model. There-
fore, we conclude that the econometric specification is roughly appropriate and thus classify our
results as credible even if the CM and LM tests reject the requirements for a properly specified
Tobit error term. The results of the comparison can be found below in table 5.
For the LPM we use on the one hand the SR as constructed in (5) and on the other hand
convert the SR additionally into a binary variable with the following property:
(6) SRi =

1 if SRi ≥ µ(SR)
0 if SRi < µ(SR)
at which µ is the mean of SR. Hence, we estimate the influence of the volunteer presence
of receiving a SR at/above or below the mean value of the SR. This is done again separately
for NPOs under increased competition and those with decreasing or stable competition. The
results of the Tobit models for NPOs facing increased competition can be found in table 2, the
results of the Tobit models for NPOs with decreased or unchanged competition are given in
table 3. The results of the LPM for both types of NPOs are given in table 4.
The beta density with the shape parameters p and q is given by:
(7) pi(y; p, q) =
Γ(p+ q)
Γ(p)Γ(q)
yp−1(1− y)q−1
with 0<y<1, p, q > 0, and Γ(·) denoting the gamma function. As the shape parameters
are difficult to interpret with regard to conditional expectations in a regression framework,
an alternative parametrization of the beta regression was independently proposed by Paolino
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(2001), Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) and Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). To achieve a
“regression friendly” version of the beta distribution in (7) these authors reparameterize the
shape parameters p and q into location and dispersion (or precision) parameters. For this
purpose, they let p = µφ and q = (1− µ)φ. Then the beta density in (7) can be rewritten as:
(8) f(y;µ, φ) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1
with 0<y<1 and φ > 0. The dependent variable y is now y ∼ B(µ, φ) and E(y) = µ with
var(y) = µ(1−µ)1+φ . If Y is a random variable with yi ∼ B(µi, φ) and i = 1, ..., n the beta
regression model is
(9) g(µi) = xiβ
where β is a vector of regression parameters and xi is the vector of covariates. Using a logit link
function for g(·) it is assured that the dependent variable lies in the unit interval and equation
(9) becomes, ln( µ1−µ) = xiβ, which is estimated in our application.
5 To shift the observations
at the margins 0 and 1 into the unit interval we use the transformation y′ = [y(N − 1) + 0.5]/N
as proposed by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006). Results for the beta regression can be found in
table 4 and a discussion of all results follows in section 6. 5.) For a detailed discussion of the
beta regression we refer to the cited authors. To conduct the beta regressions in STATA we use
the module betafit written by Buis et al. (2012).
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